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Abstract
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and indepen-
dent, one-dimensional, private values. We provide a short and constructive proof that
for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities
for all agents. We demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of our approach with
several examples. Finally, we show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant
strategy implementation breaks down when utilities are non-linear or when values are
interdependent, multi-dimensional, or correlated.
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1. Introduction
This paper revisits Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in standard social choice
environments with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values. We prove
that for any Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism there exists an equivalent domi-
nant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) mechanism that delivers the same interim expected
utilities for all agents. This equivalence result is surprising and valuable in that dominant
strategy implementation has important advantages over Bayesian implementation. In particu-
lar, dominant strategy implementation is robust to changes in agents’ beliefs and does not rely
on the assumptions of a common prior and equilibrium play.
In an inspiring recent contribution, Manelli and Vincent (2010) proved equivalence of
Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for single-unit, private-value auctions. In
this setting, each agent’s interim expected utility is determined (up to a constant) by the con-
ditional expected probability of winning the object. Manelli and Vincent’s equivalence result
thus implies that for any BIC mechanism there is a DIC mechanism that yields the same con-
ditional expected probabilities with which each alternative is selected. However, Gershkov,
Moldovanu, and Shi (2011) provide a counter example to show that this stronger result does
not extend to more general social choice environments with at least three alternatives. Their
negative conclusion does not contradict the results of this paper because of the different notion
of equivalence we employ. In particular, we define two mechanisms to be equivalent if agents’
interim expected utilities are the same, which is generally less demanding than the requirement
that the conditional expected probabilities with which each alternative occurs are the same.
We illustrate the difference within the context of the counter example proposed by Gershkov,
Moldovanu, and Shi (2011) and demonstrate that BIC-DIC equivalence continues to hold.
Our method of proof is based on a theorem due to Gutmann et al. (1991), which was
introduced to the economics literature by Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Shi (2011). The theorem
states that for any bounded, non-negative function of several variables that generates monotone,
one-dimensional marginals there exist a non-negative function that is monotone in each coor-
dinate and which produces the same one-dimensional marginals and respects the same bounds.
The proof is constructive and shows how the desired function can be found as a solution to
a minimization problem. Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Shi (2011) use this theorem to establish
BIC-DIC equivalence for social choice environments with two alternatives and for symmetric,
single-unit auctions with an arbitrary number of bidders. The restriction to two alternatives or
symmetry is necessary because the Gutmann et al. (1991) theorem concerns a single function
with given marginals. In a two-alternative social choice setting this single function can describe
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the probability with which one of the alternatives occurs (while the other alternative occurs
with complementary probability). Likewise, in a symmetric auction setting, this single function
can describe the probability with which, say, bidder 1 wins, while the remaining probability
is evenly distributed among the other bidders. The original Gutmann et al. (1991) theorem,
however, cannot be applied to general social choice environments or asymmetric auctions.
This paper generalizes the results of Manelli and Vincent (2010) and Gershkov, Moldovanu,
and Shi (2011) by considering social choice environments with an arbitrary number of players
and alternatives and arbitrary type distributions. We prove an extension of the Gutmann et al.
(1991) theorem, which involves minimizing a quadratic functional of several functions satisfying
certain boundary and marginal constraints. We provide a simple procedure to construct for
any BIC mechanism an equivalent DIC mechanism and illustrate our construction with several
examples. Finally, we show that the assumptions under which we derive BIC-DIC equivalence,
i.e. linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values, are not only sufficient but
also necessary. Using simple examples, we demonstrate that BIC-DIC equivalence fails when
one of these conditions is not met.
Within the context of auction design the implications of our equivalence result can be
highlighted as follows. BIC-DIC equivalence implies that any optimal auction (in terms of
efficiency or revenue) can be implemented using a dominant strategy mechanism such as the
second-price auction. In other words, nothing can be gained from designing more intricate
auction formats with possibly more complex Bayes-Nash equilibria. This holds not only for
single-unit auctions but also for multi-unit auctions with homogeneous or heterogeneous goods,
combinatorial auctions, and the like, as long as bidders’ private values are one-dimensional and
independent and utilities are linear.
Once we relax the assumptions underlying our main theorem, however, Bayesian implemen-
tation may have advantages over dominant strategy implementation. For example, we show
that efficiency may be strictly higher under BIC implementation when values are interdepen-
dent. Likewise, with multi-dimensional values, BIC mechanisms may result in higher revenues
than can be attained by any DIC mechanism.
1.1. Related Literature
There exists an extensive literature on implementation of social choice rules. Gibbard (1973)
and Satterthwaite (1975) show that only dictatorial choice rules are dominant strategy im-
plementable if preferences are unrestricted and there are at least three alternatives. Roberts
(1979) provides a complete characterization of social choice rules implementable in dominant
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strategies for an environment with quasi-linear preferences and at least three alternatives.1 Je-
hiel et al. (2008) extend this result to settings with multi-dimensional types and additively
separable utilities. For generic environments with multi-dimensional signals and interdepen-
dent valuations, however, Jehiel et al. (2006) show that there are no non-trivial deterministic
social choice functions that are ex post implementable. Unlike these papers, we do not study
whether a certain social choice rule is Bayesian or dominant strategy implementable. Rather
we provide a link between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation.
Along this line, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) provide sufficient conditions for BIC
social choice rules to be dominant strategy implementable and they identify environments where
these conditions are necessary. In contrast, we are not concerned with the implementation
of a given social choice rule but rather construct for any social choice rule that is Bayesian
implementable another social choice rule that is dominant strategy implementable and that
delivers the same interim expected payoffs for all agents.
A main focus of the mechanism design literature concerns the implementation of efficient
mechanisms. Green and Laffont (1977) prove that any efficient direct mechanism in which
truthful revelation is a dominant strategy is necessarily a Groves mechanism. d’Aspremont
and Ge´rard-Varet (1979), Laffont and Maskin (1979), and subsequently Williams (1999) ex-
tend this result to Bayesian environments by showing that any efficient BIC mechanism is
payoff equivalent to some Groves mechanism. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) demonstrate that
Bayesian implementation of efficient choice functions is impossible in generic settings with multi-
dimensional signals and interdependent valuations. This paper differs in that our equivalence
result applies to every BIC mechanism, not just efficient ones.
Several papers study the implementation of efficient BIC mechanisms satisfying certain addi-
tional constraints, such as budget balance and individual rationality. For instance, d’Aspremont
and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) explicitly construct mechanisms that are efficient and ex post bud-
get balanced (although they may violate individual rationality). Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) consider a classical bargaining model with incomplete information and show that gener-
ally there is no BIC mechanism that is interim individual rational and ex ante budget balanced.
Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) prove that for a given efficient interim individual rational and ex
ante budget balanced DIC mechanism, there exists a BIC mechanism that is efficient, interim
individually rational, and ex post budget balanced. As a contribution to this literature our
equivalence result suggests that Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation are equiva-
lent if only ex ante or interim constraints are imposed.
1Laffont and Maskin (1982) provide a complete characterization of dominant strategy implementable social
choice rules for the case of two alternatives. Lavi, Mualem, Nisan (2009) provide two alternative proofs of
Roberts’ result.
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Our analysis makes use of a payoff equivalence principle for BIC and DIC mechanisms. The
earliest development of this principle for DIC mechanisms can be found in Green and Laffont
(1979) and Laffont and Maskin (1979, 1980), and for BIC mechanisms in Myerson (1981). The
most general conditions under which the principle holds can be found in recent contributions
by Krishna and Maenner (2001), Milgrom and Segal (2002), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001),
and Heydenreich et al. (2009). Jehiel et al. (1996, 1999) also establish payoff equivalence for
auctions with multi-dimensional types and externalities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the social choice environment. We
prove our main BIC-DIC equivalence result in Section 3. In Section 4 we illustrate our ap-
proach with some examples and compare it to related work. In Section 5 we demonstrate that
linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values are not only sufficient but also
necessary conditions for BIC-DIC equivalence. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains
some proofs.
2. Model
We consider an environment with a finite set I = {1, 2, . . . , I} of risk-neutral agents and a
finite set K = {1, 2, . . . , K} of social alternatives. Agent i’s utility in alternative k equals
uki (xi, ti) = a
k
i xi + c
k
i + ti where xi is agent i’s private type, a
k
i , c
k
i ∈ IR are constants with
aki ≥ 0, and ti ∈ IR is a monetary transfer. Agent i’s type xi is distributed according to
probability distribution λi with support Xi, where the type space Xi ⊆ IR can be any (possibly
discrete) subset of IR. Note that types are one-dimensional and independent. Let X =
∏
i∈I Xi
and λ =
∏
i∈I λi.
Without loss of generality we consider only direct mechanisms (e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston,
and Green, 1995, Ch. 23; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Ch. 7), characterized by K+I functions,
{qk(x)}k∈K and {ti(x)}i∈I , where x = (x1, . . . , xI) ∈ X is the profile of reports, qk(x) ≥ 0 is the
probability that alternative k is implemented with
∑
k∈K q
k(x) = 1, and ti(x) is the amount
agent i receives. When agent i reports x′i and all other agents report truthfully, the conditional
expected probability (from agent i’s point of view) that alternative k is chosen is Qki (x
′
i) =
Ex−i(q
k(x′i,x−i)) and the conditional expected transfer to agent i is Ti(x
′
i) = Ex−i(ti(x
′
i,x−i)).
For later use we define, for i ∈ I and x ∈ X,
vi(x) ≡
∑
k∈K
aki q
k(x)
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with marginals Vi(xi) =
∑
k∈K a
k
iQ
k
i (xi) and the modified transfers
τi(x) = ti(x) +
∑
k∈K
cki q
k(x)
with marginals Ti(xi) = Ex−i(τi(xi,x−i)) = Ti(xi) +
∑
k c
k
iQ
k
i (xi). When agent i’s type is xi
and she reports being of type x′i her interim expected utility can then be written as
ui(x
′
i) = Vi(x
′
i)xi + Ti(x′i).
In this paper we restrict attention to Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) and dominant strat-
egy incentive compatible (DIC) mechanisms. A mechanism is BIC if truthful reporting by all
agents constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. A mechanism is DIC if truthful reporting is a
dominant strategy equilibrium. To relate BIC and DIC mechanisms we employ the following
notion of equivalence.
Definition 1. Two mechanisms M and M˜ are equivalent if they deliver the same interim
expected utilities for all agents.
For single-unit auctions, equivalence implies that M and M˜ yield identical conditional winning
probabilities, see Manelli and Vincent (2010). In general, however, our definition of equivalence
does not require that the conditional expected probability with which each alternative occurs
is the same under both mechanisms.
3. BIC–DIC Equivalence
We first consider connected type spaces, i.e. Xi = [xi, xi] ⊆ IR. In this case a mechanism is
BIC if and only if (i) for all i ∈ I and xi ∈ Xi, Vi(xi) is non-decreasing in xi and (ii) agents’
interim expected utilities satisfy
ui(xi) = ui(xi) +
∫ xi
xi
Vi(t)dt,
see, for instance, Krishna and Maenner (2001), Milgrom and Segal (2002), and Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001). Similarly a mechanism is DIC if and only if (i) for all i ∈ I and x ∈ X,
vi(xi,x−i) is non-decreasing in xi and (ii) agents’ utilities can be expressed as
ui(xi,x−i) = ui(xi,x−i) +
∫ xi
xi
vi(t,x−i)dt,
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see, for instance, Laffont and Masking (1980) and Heydenreich, Mu¨ller, Uetz, and Vohra (2009).
Hence, with connected type spaces, agents’ utilities are determined (up to a constant) by the
allocation rule. This allows us to define equivalence in terms of the allocation rule only. Consider
two mechanisms M and M˜ and choose transfers such that ui(xi) = u˜i(xi) for all i ∈ I, then M
and M˜ are equivalent if and only if Vi(xi) = V˜i(xi) for all i ∈ I, xi ∈ Xi.
We now state and prove our main result. Define v(x) = A · q(x) with elements vi(x) for
i ∈ I, and let || · || denote the usual Euclidean norm: ||v(x)||2 = ∑i∈I vi(x)2. Throughout we
identify functions that are equal almost everywhere with respect to λ.
Theorem 1. Let Xi be connected for all i ∈ I and let (q˜, t˜) denote a BIC mechanism. An
equivalent DIC mechanism is given by (q, t), where the allocation rule q solves
min
{qk}k∈K
qk(x)≥ 0 ∀k,x∑
kq
k(x) = 1 ∀x
Vi(xi) = V˜i(xi) ∀i,xi
Ex(qk(x)) =Ex(q˜k(x)) ∀k
Ex
(||v(x)||2) (1)
and the transfers t follow from
τi(xi,x−i) = T˜i(xi) + vi(xi,x−i)xi − vi(xi,x−i)xi +
∫ xi
xi
vi(t,x−i)dt. (2)
Expected transfers are the same under the BIC and DIC mechanisms, i.e. Ex(ti(x)) = Ex(t˜i(x))
for all i ∈ I, and, hence, so is expected social surplus.
Proof. The main difficulty of the proof is to establish that a solution vi(xi,x−i) to (1) is
non-decreasing in xi, which we do in three steps. First, we consider discrete and uniformly dis-
tributed types, then we extend to the continuous uniform types using a discrete approximation,
and, finally, we generalize to arbitrary type distributions. The first step, which provides an
extension of the Gutmann et. al (1991) theorem, is covered in the main text while the proofs
for the more technical second and third steps can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Suppose, for all i ∈ I, Xi is a discrete set and λi is uniform distribution on Xi.
Let {qk}k∈K be a solution to (1) then vi(x) is non-decreasing in xi for all i ∈ I, x ∈ X.
Proof. Let C(q˜) denote the collection of {qk}k∈K that satisfy the constraints in (1). Note
that C(q˜) is non-empty since q˜ ∈ C(q˜). Furthermore, for discrete X, C(q˜) is a compact and
convex subset of [0, 1]K|X| and Ex
(||v(x)||2) defines a convex function so existence of a so-
lution to (1) follows from standard arguments. Let {qk}k∈K be a solution to (1). We need
to show that vi(x) is non-decreasing in xi for all i ∈ I and x ∈ X. Suppose, in contra-
diction, that vj(xj,x−j) > vj(x′j,x−j) for some j, x
′
j > xj, and some x−j. Since {q˜k}k∈K
6
is a BIC mechanism Ex−j(vj(xj,x−j)) = Ex−j(v˜j(xj,x−j)) is non-decreasing in xj. Hence,
there exists x′−j for which vj(xj,x
′
−j) < vj(x
′
j,x
′
−j). Let α ≡ ε/(vj(xj,x−j) − vj(x′j,x−j)) and
α′ ≡ ε/(vj(x′j,x′−j) − vj(xj,x′−j)) then, for small ε > 0, we have 0 < α < 1 and 0 < α′ < 1.
Define the perturbations
q′(xj,x−j) = (1− α)q(xj,x−j) + αq(x′j,x−j), q′(x′j,x−j) = (1− α)q(x′j,x−j) + αq(xj,x−j)
q′(xj,x′−j) = (1− α′)q(xj,x′−j) + α′q(x′j,x′−j), q′(x′j,x′−j) = (1− α′)q(x′j,x′−j) + α′q(xj,x′−j)
and q′(x) = q(x) for other x ∈ X. By construction q′k(x) ≥ 0 and ∑k∈K q′k(x) = 1 for all
x ∈ X. Also Ex(q′(x)) = Ex(q(x)) since q′(xj,x−j) + q′(x′j,x−j) + q′(xj,x′−j) + q′(x′j,x′−j) =
q(xj,x−j) + q(x′j,x−j) + q(xj,x
′
−j) + q(x
′
j,x
′
−j). We next show that the perturbations q
′ also
produce the same marginals as q. Rewrite the above perturbations in terms of v′(x) = A·q′(x):
v′(xj,x−j) = (1− α)v(xj,x−j) + αv(x′j,x−j), v′(x′j,x−j) = (1− α)v(x′j,x−j) + αv(xj,x−j)
v′(xj,x′−j) = (1− α′)v(xj,x′−j) + α′v(x′j,x′−j), v′(x′j,x′−j) = (1− α′)v(x′j,x′−j) + α′v(xj,x′−j)
and the equal-margin condition as Ex−i(v
′
i(xi,x−i)) = Ex−i(vi(xi,x−i)). For i = j this condition
follows from α(vj(xj,x−j)− vj(x′j,x−j)) = α′(vj(x′j,x′−j)− vj(xj,x′−j)) when xi = xj or xi = x′j
while for other values of xi it follows trivially. For i 6= j the condition follows since v′(xj,x−j)+
v′(x′j,x−j) = v(xj,x−j) + v(x
′
j,x−j) and v
′(xj,x′−j) + v
′(x′j,x
′
−j) = v(xj,x
′
−j) + v(x
′
j,x
′
−j).
Finally,
Ex
(||v′(x)||2 − ||v(x)||2) = −2α(1− α)|X| ||v(xj,x−j)− v(x′j,x−j)||2
−2α
′(1− α′)
|X| ||v(x
′
j,x
′
−j)− v(xj,x′−j)||2
a contradiction since the right side is strictly negative and {qk}k∈K solves (1). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. Suppose, for all i ∈ I, Xi = [0, 1] and λi is the uniform distribution on Xi. Let
{qk}k∈K denote a solution to (1) then vi(x) is non-decreasing in xi for all i ∈ I, x ∈ X.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. The idea is to consider a partition of [0, 1]K|X| and
define a discrete approximation of the Bayesian mechanism {q˜k}k∈K by replacing the q˜k with
their averages in each element of the partition. Lemma 1 ensures there exists an equivalent
DIC mechanism {qk}k∈K for this discrete approximation. The qk can be extended to piecewise
constant functions over [0, 1]K|X|. The result follows by considering increasingly finer partitions
of [0, 1].
Lemma 3. Suppose, for all i ∈ I, Xi ⊆ IR and λi is some distribution on Xi. Let {qk}k∈K
denote a solution to (1) then vi(x) is non-decreasing in xi for all i ∈ I, x ∈ X.
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The proof can be found in the Appendix. The intuition is to consider a transformation of
variables and relate the uniform distribution covered by Lemma 2 to the case of a general
distribution. In particular, if the random variable Zi is uniformly distributed then λ
(−1)
i (Zi),
with λ
(−1)
i (zi) = inf{xi ∈ Xi|λi(xi) ≥ zi}, is distributed according to λi.
We next establish that the interim expected utilities ui(xi) in the DIC mechanism (q, t) are the
same as the interim expected utilities u˜i(xi) in the BIC mechanism (q˜, t˜). Taking expectations
over x−i in (2) yields
Ti(xi) = T˜i(xi) + Vi(xi)xi − Vi(xi)xi +
∫ xi
xi
Vi(t)dt
= T˜i(xi) + V˜i(xi)xi − V˜i(xi)xi +
∫ xi
xi
V˜i(t)dt
= u˜i(xi)− V˜i(xi)xi = T˜i(xi)
and, hence, ui(xi) = Vi(xi)xi + Ti(xi) = V˜i(xi)xi + T˜i(xi) = u˜i(xi). Furthermore, expected
transfers are the same under the BIC and DIC mechanisms since
Ex(ti(x)) = Ex(t˜i(x)) +
∑
k∈K
cki
(
Ex(q˜
k(x))− Ex(qk(x))
)
= Ex(t˜i(x))
where we used that the ex ante expected probability with which each alternative occurs is the
same under the BIC and DIC mechanisms, i.e. Ex(q
k(x)) = Ex(q˜
k(x)) for all k ∈ K, which is
imposed as a constraint in the minimization problem (1). Expected social surplus is simply the
sum of expected transfers plus the sum of the (ex ante) expected utilities of the agents, which
is the same for the BIC and DIC mechanisms. Q.E.D.
Note that Lemma 3 above applies to any distribution, not just continuous ones. We used the
assumption of continuous type spaces only to invoke payoff equivalence, which allowed us to
define the DIC transfers as in (2). To prove BIC-DIC equivalence more generally, we next
provide an explicit construction of the DIC transfers when type spaces are discrete.
For each i ∈ I let Xi = {l1i , . . . , lNii }. A mechanism (q˜, t˜) is BIC if and only if (i) for all
i ∈ I and li ∈ Xi, V˜i(li) is non-decreasing in li and (ii) the transfers satisfy
(V˜i(l
n
i )− V˜i(ln−1i ))ln−1i ≤ T˜i(ln−1i )− T˜i(lni ) ≤ (V˜i(lni )− V˜i(ln−1i ))lni (3)
for n = 2, . . . , Ni. Similarly, a mechanism (q, t) is DIC if and only if (i) for all i ∈ I and l ∈ X,
v˜i(li, l−i) is non-decreasing in li and (ii) the transfers satisfy
(vi(l
n
i , l−i)− vi(ln−1i , l−i))ln−1i ≤ τi(ln−1i , l−i)− τi(lni , l−i) ≤ (vi(lni , l−i)− vi(ln−1i , l−i))lni (4)
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for n = 2, . . . , Ni. Note that both the BIC and DIC incentive constraints are based on utility
comparisons for adjacent types only, i.e. ln−1i and l
n
i . In the Appendix we show that, with
one-dimensional types, these necessary conditions are also sufficient (e.g. Vohra, 2011). This
is not generally true with multi-dimensional types as we demonstrate in Section 5.
Define the modified DIC transfers
τi(l
n
i , l−i) = T˜i(l1i )−
n∑
m=2
(vi(l
m
i , l−i)− vi(lm−1i , l−i))αmi (5)
for n = 1, . . . , Ni,
2 i ∈ I, and l−i ∈ X−i, where
αni ≡
T˜i(ln−1i )− T˜i(lni )
V˜i(lni )− V˜i(ln−1i )
if V˜i(l
n
i ) 6= V˜i(ln−1i ) and αni = lni otherwise. Note that the BIC constraints (3) imply that
ln−1i ≤ αni ≤ lni , which, in turn, implies that the difference in DIC transfers
τi(l
n−1
i , l−i)− τi(lni , l−i) = (vi(lni , l−i)− vi(ln−1i , l−i))αni
satisfies the bounds in (4).
Now let {qk}k∈K denote a solution to minimization problem in (1). Lemma 1 ensures
that the associated vi(l) is non-decreasing in li for all i ∈ I, l ∈ X, and by construction
Vi(li) = El−i(vi(li, l−i)) = V˜i(li). Taking expectations over l−i in (5) yields
Ti(lni ) = T˜i(ln1 )−
n∑
m=2
(Vi(l
m
i )− Vi(lm−1i ))αmi
= T˜i(ln1 ) +
n∑
m=2
(T˜i(lmi )− T˜i(lm−1i )) = T˜i(lni )
for n = 1, . . . , Ni. Hence, ui(li) = Vi(li)li + Ti(li) = V˜i(li)li + T˜i(li) = u˜i(li), i.e. the DIC
mechanism (q, t) yields the same interim expected utilities as (q˜, t˜).
Theorem 2. Let Xi be discrete for all i ∈ I and let (q˜, t˜) denote a BIC mechanism. An
equivalent DIC mechanism is given by (q, t), where the allocation rule q solves (1) and the
transfers follow from (5). Expected transfers and expected social surplus are the same under the
BIC and DIC mechanisms.
2Where we use the convention that
∑1
m=2 1 = 0.
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The fact that expected transfers and expected social surplus are the same follows from Ti(li) =
T˜i(li) for all li ∈ Xi and the constraint, imposed in (1), that the ex ante expected probability
with which each alternative occurs is the same under the BIC and DIC mechanisms.
4. Relation to Other Papers
In this section we illustrate our approach with some examples and relate our results to those
of Manelli and Vincent (2010) for single-unit, private value auctions. First, we contrast our
findings with those of Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Shi (2011) who present a counter example to
DIC-BIC equivalence when there are three social alternatives.
4.1. GMS Counter Example
Following Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Shi (2011) consider the following example with I = 2
agents and K = 3 alternatives. Agent 1 has types x1 < x2 and agent 2 has types y1 < y2.
For both agents, types are independent and equally likely. The utility (net of any transfers)
of agent 1 with type xi is axi + c in alternative 1, xi + d in alternative 2, and v (independent
of agent 1’s type) in alternative 3. Agent 2’s utilities simply follow by replacing the xi with
yi. It is assumed that 0 < a < 1 with no restrictions on the constants c, d, and v. The utility
parameters are summarized by the matrices
A =
(
a 1 0
a 1 0
)
, C =
(
c d v
c d v
)
Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Shi (2011) start with the following allocation rule
q˜1 = s
(
1 1
1 13
)
, q˜2 = as
(
9 1
1 1
)
,
and q˜3ij = 1− q˜1ij − q˜2ij with s = 1/15 and q˜kij ≡ q˜k(xi, yj). It is easy to verify that the {q˜k}k∈K
are Bayesian implementable since
A · q˜ = as
(
10 2
2 14
)
has non-decreasing marginals, i.e. 6as for the low type and 8as for the high type. The {q˜k}k∈K
are not dominant strategy implementable since A · q˜ is not everywhere non-decreasing.
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The question whether there is an equivalent DIC mechanism boils down to whether there
exist q = (q1, q2, q3) such that A · q is everywhere non-decreasing and A · q has the same
marginals as A · q˜, i.e. ∑k∈K akiQki (xi) = ∑k∈K aki Q˜ki (xi). Note that since A does not have
full rank, the equal-marginal condition does not require that q has the same marginals as q˜.
Indeed, Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Shi (2011) show that there exist no {qk}k∈K that satisfy
Qki (xi) = Q˜
k
i (xi) and are such that A · q is everywhere non-decreasing.
Their result seems to contradict Theorem 2. It does not, however, because there are other
solutions to the condition that A·q produces the same marginals as A·q˜ besides those considered
by Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Shi (2011). Indeed, it is straightforward to solve the minimization
problem in (1) to find {qk}k∈K that define an equivalent DIC mechanism:
q1 = s
(
4 6
5 1
)
, q2 = as
(
1 1
2 8
)
.
4.2. Private-Value Auctions
Manelli and Vincent (2010) recently proved equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy
implementation for single-unit, private-value auctions. Their approach is similar to ours in
some respects, e.g. their proof is constructive and covers the continuous case by considering a
discrete approximation. There are, however, some differences. Most importantly, our analysis is
not restricted to the single-unit auction case and includes multi-unit auctions for homogeneous
and heterogeneous goods, combinatorial auctions, and the like.3 Indeed, applications of our
BIC-DIC equivalence result extend beyond the auction context and include, for instance, public
goods provision.
But also for single-unit auctions, our approach differs in several respects. First, Manelli
and Vincent (2010) restrict attention to continuous distributions with connected supports.
The discrete case covered by our Theorem 2 thus provides an important extension of their
results. Moreover, Manelli and Vincent (2010) first prove BIC-DIC equivalence for the case with
symmetric bidders (their Theorem 1), then introduce asymmetries between bidders (Theorem
2), and, finally, allow for the seller to have her own private value for the object (Theorem 3).
These different cases are all covered by the minimization approach in (1). To see this,
consider a setup with I + 1 agents (I bidders plus one seller) and K = I + 1 alternatives. If
the seller has no private value for the object we simply set aii = 1 for i = 1, . . . , I and aik = 0
otherwise (and cik = 0). By including the seller as the (I + 1)-th agent, the possibility that the
3Assuming types are one-dimensional, independent, and private.
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object does not sell is included. In fact, the constraint
∑
k∈K q
k(x) = 1 in (1) becomes
I∑
k=1
qk(x) = 1− qI+1(x),
which combined with Ex(q
k(x)) = Ex(q˜
k(x)) for all k ∈ K implies that if the seller does
not sell with some probability in the original BIC mechanism then she does not sell with the
same probability in the equivalent DIC mechanism. Furthermore, by including the seller as the
(I+1)-th agent, the minimization approach in (1) implies that the constructed DIC mechanism
generates the same expected revenue for the seller, since expected revenue is equal to the sum of
bidders’ expected payments. A fortiori, the DIC mechanism generates the same expected social
surplus. To summarize, the constructed DIC mechanism is efficiency and revenue equivalent to
the original BIC mechanism.
Moreover, if the original BIC mechanism is symmetric an equivalent symmetric DIC mech-
anism can be found by including symmetry as a constraint in (1).4 Finally, the minimization
approach in (1) also applies when the seller’s private value is distributed over some range. In
this case, we simply treat the seller like the bidders and set aii = 1 for i = 1, . . . , I + 1 and
aik = 0 otherwise.
To illustrate, consider a single-unit private value auction with I = 2 bidders whose values,
labeled x1 and x2, are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Suppose the seller
does not allocate the object if the difference between bidders’ values is too high, i.e. when
|x1 − x2| > α for some α ≤ 1/2.5 In all other cases, the seller allocates the object efficiently,
see the left panel of Figure 1. Note that the allocation rule is not monotone and, hence, cannot
be implemented in dominant strategies (Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1992).
Denote the probability that bidder k = 1, 2 gets the object by q˜k and the probability that
the seller keeps the object by q˜3. So there are K = 3 states, a11 = a22 = 1 and aik = 0 otherwise
(and cik = 0). For i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} the allocation rule can be stated as
q˜i(x) =
{
1 if xj ≤ xi ≤ xj + α
0 otherwise
4Note that the resulting constraint set is again non-empty and convex.
5For example, suppose the xi represent possible cost reductions from an innovation. Then a market regulator
may prohibit the introduction of this innovation when the cost reductions are too asymmetric. In particular, if
one firm’s cost reduction is much larger than another’s, the advantaged firm may be able to push the rival out
of the market and gain monopoly power.
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0 α 1
α
1
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
0 α 1
α
1
(x1, x2) (α, x2)
(x1, α) (α, α)
Figure 1: BIC allocation rule (left) and DIC allocation rule (right) for α ≤ 1/2. Here (q1, q2)
represent the probabilities that bidders (1, 2) win the object.
while q˜3(x) = 1− q˜1(x)− q˜2(x). This allocation rule has non-decreasing marginals
∫ 1
0
q˜i(x)dxj = min(xi, α)
for i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, and is thus Bayesian implementable. For α ≤ 1/2 the allocation rule
qi(x) = min(xi, α)
for i = 1, 2 and q3(x) = 1−min(x1, α)−min(x2, α) is a solution to minimization problem (1).
This solution is shown in the right panel of Figure 1. Since the {qi} for i = 1, 2 are everywhere
non-decreasing in xi they are dominant strategy implementable: supplemented with appropriate
payments, they define an equivalent DIC mechanism.
5. The Limits of BIC–DIC Equivalence
In this section we present a series of simple examples, based on auction environments with two
bidders and discrete types, which demonstrate that BIC-DIC equivalence generally does not
hold when we relax the assumption of linear utilities or when types are not one-dimensional,
private, and independent. Recall from the previous section that the constructed DIC mechanism
is efficiency and revenue equivalent to the original BIC mechanism, which will prove useful in
understanding the design of the counter-examples.
Denote the seller’s expected revenue by R and expected social surplus by W . Relaxing
13
constraints in a revenue-maximization problem can only increase the achieved revenue level, so
max
BIC, IR
R ≥ max
DIC, IR
R ≥ max
DIC, IR
same bidder utilities
R
where IR, DIC, and BIC represent the individual rationality, dominant strategy incentive com-
patibility, and Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints respectively. For BIC-DIC equiva-
lence to hold, these conditions have to be met with equality.6 Conversely, if one of the conditions
does not hold with equality, e.g. if the optimal DIC mechanism yields strictly less revenue than
the optimal BIC mechanism, then BIC-DIC equivalence fails. A similar logic applies to social
surplus, e.g. if the most efficient DIC mechanism yields strictly less welfare than the most
efficient BIC mechanism then BIC-DIC equivalence fails.
5.1. Interdependent Values
Consider a discrete version of an example due to Maskin (1992). There are two bidders, labeled
i = 1, 2, who compete for a single object. Bidder i’s value for the object is xi + 2xj, where
i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} and the signal xi is equally likely to be x1 = 1 or x2 = 10. Because of the higher
weight on the other’s signal, the first-best symmetric allocation rule is to assign the object to
the lowest-signal bidder (with ties broken randomly)
q1 =
(
1
2
1
0 1
2
)
,
and q2ij = q
1
ji where we defined q
k
ij = q
k(xi1, x
j
2) for i, j, k = 1, 2. The total surplus generated by
the first-best allocation rule is W = 150/8.
Maskin (1992) used a continuous version of this example to show that the first-best al-
location rule is not Bayesian implementable. Here this follows simply because the marginals
are decreasing in a bidder’s signal. It is a simple linear programming problem to find the
surplus-maximizing allocation rule that respects Bayesian incentive compatibility:
q1 =
(
0 3
4
1
4
1
2
)
, (6)
and q2ij = q
1
ji, yielding a total surplus of W = 135/8. Note that this “second-best” allocation
rule does not always assign the object and that the marginal probability of winning is constant.
6It is important to point out that our BIC-DIC equivalence result in Section 3 is not constrained to revenue-
maximizing BIC mechanisms. Here we limit attention to surplus-maximizing and revenue-maximizing BIC
mechanisms only to derive conditions under which BIC-DIC equivalence fails.
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Importantly, the allocation rule is not monotone, so the second-best solution is not dominant
strategy incentive compatible.7
For this example, the DIC mechanism that maximizes surplus is given by
q1 =
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
,
and q2ij = q
1
ji, yielding a total surplus of W = 132/8. In other words, there exists no DIC
mechanism that generates the same total surplus as the second-best solution in (6).
More generally, BIC–DIC equivalence breaks down with interdependent values even when
the interdependencies are small. Suppose, for instance, that bidder i’s value is xi + αxj for
i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} and α ≥ 0. Consider the BIC mechanism in (6), which generates surplus
W = 3
8
(11 + 17α).8 The DIC allocation rule that gives the bidders the same interim expected
utilities and maximizes surplus is given by
q1 =
(
1
4
1
2
1
4
1
2
)
,
and q2ij = q
1
ji, yielding a surplus of W =
3
8
(11 + 14α). To summarize, only with private values
(α = 0), is it possible to construct an equivalent DIC mechanism.
5.2. Correlated Values
Cremer and McLean (1988, Appendix A) construct an example with correlated values for
which a BIC mechanism extracts all surplus from the buyers while full-surplus extraction is not
possible with a DIC mechanism.
5.3. Multi-Dimensional Signals
Consider a two-unit auction with I = 2 bidders whose types are equally likely to be x1 = (1, 1),
x2 = (2, 0), or x3 = (4, 3), where the first (second) number represents the marginal value for
the first (second) unit. Note that marginal values are non-increasing for all three types, i.e.
goods are substitutes. There are K = 3 possible alternatives: (0, 2) where both units go to
7Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (2009) previously demonstrated these properties for a continuous version
of Maskin’s (1992) example where the signals xi are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. They also provide a general
characterization of second-best efficient mechanisms and show that, with two bidders, the second-best solution
can be implemented via an English auction (Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci, 2011).
8Note that (6) is not necessarily second-best for all α ≥ 0.
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bidder 2, (1, 1) where each bidder gets a unit, and (2, 0) where both units go to bidder 1. It is
straightforward to characterize the efficient allocation rule
q1 =
 0 0 10 0 1
0 0 0
 , q2 =
 1 1 01 1 0
0 0 1
 , q3 =
 0 0 00 0 0
1 1 0
 .
There are many marginal payments that support the efficient allocation rule as part of a BIC
mechanism, e.g. (T˜ 1, T˜ 2, T˜ 3) = (0, 0, 1), resulting in interim expected utilities of u(x1) = 2
3
,
u(x2) = 4
3
, and u(x3) = 5 for both bidders.9 There is, however, no efficient DIC mechanism
that gives the same interim expected utilities to the bidders. To see this, note that requiring
the same interim expected utilities when using the same efficient allocation rule implies that
the marginal payments are the same: 1
3
∑
j t
1j
i = 0,
1
3
∑
j t
2j
i = 0, and
1
3
∑
j t
3j
i = 1 for i = 1, 2.
Some of the dominant strategy incentive constraints for bidder i when her type is xi and she
faces an opponent of type xj, to not report xˆi are
(xi = x
1, xj = x
2, xˆi = x
3) : t32i ≥ 1 + t12i
(xi = x
1, xj = x
1, xˆi = x
3) : t31i ≥ 1 + t11i
(xi = x
1, xj = x
3, xˆi = x
2) : t23i ≥ t13i
(xi = x
2, xj = x
3, xˆi = x
3) : t33i ≥ 2 + t23i
Combining these constraints with the marginal payment conditions yields a contradiction
3 = t31i + t
32
i + t
33
i ≥ 4 + t11i + t12i + t23i ≥ 4 + t11i + t12i + t13i = 4.
The difference with the one-dimensional case, and the reason that Theorem 2 does not apply,
is that incentive compatibility requires more than just pairwise comparisons. With multi-
dimensional types it is possible that, say, x1 wants to deviate to x3 even though x1 does not
want to deviate to x2 and x2 does not want to deviate to x3. In the multi-dimensional type
setting, Bayesian implementation imposes weaker conditions since some of the constraints that
are violated under dominant strategy implementation may not be violated in expectation, i.e.
when averaged over several types. Indeed, this is the case in the example presented here.
9To verify Bayesian incentive compatibility, note that when a bidder of type x1 reports being of type xˆ her
interim expected utility is ( 23 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 ) for xˆ = (x
1, x2, x3). Likewise, for a bidder of type x2 the interim expected
utilities ( 43 ,
4
3 , 1) for xˆ = (x
1, x2, x3). Finally, for a bidder of type x3 the interim expected utilities ( 83 ,
8
3 , 5) for
xˆ = (x1, x2, x3). Hence, truth telling xˆ = x is an equilibrium.
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An interesting consequence is that with multi-dimensional types, BIC mechanisms may
result in higher seller revenue than is possible under dominant strategy implementation. For
example, consider a variant of the above setup with x1 = (1, 1), x2 = (2, 0), and x3 = (3, 0).
It is a standard linear-programming exercise to find the BIC mechanism that maximizes seller
revenue:
q˜1 =

1
2
0 1
1 0 0
0 0 0
 , q˜2 =
 0 0 00 1 1
0 1 1
 , q˜3 =

1
2
1 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
 .
supported by marginal payments (T˜ 1, T˜ 2, T˜ 3) = (1, 4
3
, 7
3
) and resulting in seller revenues of
R = 28/9. Now suppose we replace the BIC constraints with DIC constraints and we again
maximize seller revenue without requiring that the DIC mechanism yields the same interim
expected utilities for the bidders. In other words, we consider the optimal, i.e. revenue-
maximizing, DIC mechanism. The solution for the allocation rule is the same as for the BIC
case, i.e. qk = q˜k for k = 1, 2, 3, while the supporting payments are
t1 =
 1 0 023 0 23
3
2
0 2
3
 , t2 =
 1
2
3
3
2
0 0 0
0 2
3
2
3
 ,
resulting in seller revenues of R = 3. In other words, the optimal DIC mechanism produces
strictly less revenues than the optimal BIC mechanism, and BIC-DIC equivalence fails.
5.4. Non-linear Utilities
We can reinterpret the multi-dimensional type examples of the previous subsection in terms of
non-linear utilities. Consider, for instance, the last example where a bidder’s utility when her
type is xi and the state is k, for i, k = 1, 2, 3, are summarized by the matrix
uik =
 0 1 20 2 2
0 3 3
 ,
Let us introduce three one-dimensional types, θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2, and θ3, and, for both bidders,
the non-linear utility functions uk for k = 1, 2, 3, where u1(θ) = 0, u2(θ) = θ, and u3(θ) =
1
2
θ2 − 3
2
θ + 3. It is easy to verify that this non-linear model reproduces the utilities of the
above matrix. Hence, bidders’ interim expected utilities and their incentives to deviate are
identical to those in the multi-dimensional example. A direct consequence is that again there is
an optimal BIC mechanism that produces strictly higher revenues than is possible under DIC
implementation.
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6. Discussion
This paper establishes a link between dominant strategy and Bayesian implementation for a
general class of social choice problems. When utilities are linear and types are one-dimensional,
independent, and private, we prove that for any social choice rule that is Bayesian imple-
mentable there exists a (possibly different) social choice rule that yields the same interim
expected utilities for all agents and that is implementable in dominant strategies.
Dominant strategy implementation is more robust than Bayesian implementation since it
does not rely on the assumptions of common prior beliefs and equilibrium play. In many
settings, these assumptions are untenable. In contrast, dominant strategy implementation is
robust to changes in agents’ beliefs and allows agents to optimize without having to take into
account others’ behavior.
This paper also delineates the boundaries for BIC-DIC equivalence. When types are corre-
lated, Cremer and McLean (1988) provide an example where a BIC mechanism yields strictly
higher seller revenue than is attainable by any DIC mechanism. The example in Section 5.1
shows that with interdependent values, the expected social surplus generated by a BIC mecha-
nism may be strictly higher than what can be generated by any DIC mechanism. When types
are multi-dimensional or utilities are non-linear, BIC mechanisms may produce strictly higher
seller revenue than is possible with DIC mechanisms, see the examples in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
The equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation thus requires linear
utilities and one-dimensional, independent, and private values. When these conditions are met,
Bayesian implementation provides no more flexibility than dominant strategy implementation
in a general class of social choice problems.
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A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Let C(q˜) denote the collection of {qk}k∈K that satisfy the constraints in
(1). Note that C(q˜) is non-empty since q˜ ∈ C(q˜). Furthermore, C(q˜) is a non-empty, compact
and convex subset of {f ∈ L∞([0, 1]I) | 0 ≤ f ≤ 1} and El
(||v(x)||2) defines a convex functional
– again the solution to (1) exists.10 The intuition behind the proof is to relate this solution to
that of Lemma 1 by taking a discrete approximation. For i ∈ I, n ≥ 1, li = 1, . . . , 2n, define
the sets Si(n, li) = [(li − 1)2−n, li2−n), which yield a partition of [0, 1) into 2n disjoint intervals
of equal length. Let Fni denote the set consisting of all possible unions of the Si(n, li). Note
that Fni ⊂ Fn+1i . Also let l = (l1, ..., lI) and S(n, l) =
∏
i∈I Si(n, li), which defines a partition
of [0, 1)I into disjoint half-open cubes of volume 2−nI . Let {q˜k}k∈K define a BIC mechanism
and consider, for each i ∈ I, the averages
q˜k(n, l) = 2nI
∫
S(n,l)
q˜k(x)dx (A.1)
El−i v˜i(n, l) = 2
n
∫
Si(n,li)
Ex−i v˜i(x)dxi (A.2)
Since q˜k(x) ≥ 0 and ∑k q˜k(x) = 1 we have q˜k(n, l) ≥ 0 and ∑k q˜k(n, l) = 1. By construction∑
l−i v˜i(n, l) = 2
n(I−1)El−i v˜i(n, l), which is non-decreasing in li by (A.2).
Lemma 1 applied to the case where, for each i ∈ I, Xi = {1, . . . , 2n} and λi is the discrete
uniform distribution on Xi, implies there exist {qk(n, l)}k∈K with qk(n, l) ≥ 0 and
∑
k q
k(n, l) =
1 such that
∑
l−i vi(n, l) =
∑
l−i v˜i(n, l),
∑
l q
k(n, l) =
∑
l q˜
k(n, l), and vi(n, l) is non-decreasing
in li for all l.
For each i ∈ I, n ≥ 1 define qk(n,x) = qk(n, l) for all x ∈ S(n, l). Then qk(n,x) ≥ 0,∑
k q
k(n,x) = 1, and for each i ∈ I, vi(n,x) is non-decreasing in xi for all x. Furthermore∫
Si(n,li)
Ex−i v˜i(x)dxi = 2
−nEl−i v˜i(n, l) = 2
−nI∑
l−i v˜i(n, l) = 2
−nI∑
l−i vi(n, l)
=
∑
l−i
∫
S(n,l)
vi(n,x)dx =
∫
Si(n,li)×[0,1]I−1 vi(n,x)dx
Thus vi(n,x)−Ex−i(v˜i(x)) integrates to 0 over every set Si × [0, 1]I−1 with Si ∈ Fni . Similarly
qk(n,x) − q˜k(x) integrates to 0 over every set [0, 1]I . Consider any (weak*) convergent subse-
quence from the sequence {qk(n,x)}k∈K for n ≥ 1, with limit {qk(x)}k∈K. Then {qk(x)}k∈K
defines a DIC mechanism that is equivalent to {q˜k(x)}k∈K. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. The intuition behind the proof is to relate the unique solution to (1)
to that of the uniform case of Lemma 2. Recall that if the random variable Zi is uniformly
10See Gutmann et al. (1991, p. 1784). If the objective is a strictly convex functional the solution is unique.
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distributed then λ−1i (Zi) is distributed according to λi.
11 Hence, consider for all i ∈ I and
z ∈ [0, 1]I , the functions q˜′k(z) = q˜k(λ−11 (z1), . . . , λ−1I (zI)). Since
Ez−i(v˜
′
i(z)) = Ex−i(v˜i(λ
−1
i (zi),x−i)) (A.3)
the mechanism defined by {q˜′k}k∈K is BIC and by Lemma 2 there exists an equivalent DIC
mechanism {q′k}k∈K where q′k : [0, 1]I → [0, 1]. In particular, q′ minimizes Ez
(
v(z)2
)
and
satisfies the constraints q′k(z) ≥ 0, ∑k q′k(z) = 1, and Ez−i(v′i(z)) = Ex−i(v˜i(λ−1i (zi),x−i)) for
all i ∈ I. Now define {qk}k∈K with qk : X → [0, 1] where qk(x) = q′k(λ1(x1), . . . , λI(xI)).
Then {qk}k∈K solves (1) since Ex
(
v(x)2
)
= Ez
(
v′k(z)2
)
and qk(x) ≥ 0, ∑k qk(x) = 1, and
Ex−i(vi(x)) = Ez−i(v
′
i(λi(xi), z−i)) = Ex−i(v˜i(x)) for all i ∈ I and xi ∈ Xi. Furthermore,
vi(x) =
∑
k aikq
k(x) =
∑
k aikq
′k(λ1(x1), . . . , λI(xI)) is non-decreasing in xi for all k ∈ K,
x ∈ X since {q′}k∈K is a DIC mechanism, λ is non-decreasing, and aik ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Additional remarks to the proof of Theorem 2. For completeness, we show here that
the necessary BIC (DIC) conditions (i) and (ii) are also sufficient. Consider (3) which ensures
that deviating to an adjacent type, e.g. from ln−1i to l
n
i , is not profitable. Now consider types
lpi < l
q
i < l
r
i . We show that if it is not profitable for type l
p
i to deviate to type l
q
i and it is not
profitable for type lqi to deviate to type l
r
i then it is not profitable for type l
p
i to deviate to type
lri . The assumptions imply
V˜i(l
p
i )l
p
i + T˜i(lpi ) ≥ V˜i(lqi )lpi + T˜i(lqi ), V˜i(lqi )lqi + T˜i(lqi ) ≥ V˜i(lri )lqi + T˜i(lri )
and, hence,
V˜i(l
p
i )l
p
i + T˜i(lpi ) ≥ V˜i(lri )lpi + T˜i(lri ) + (V˜i(lri )− V˜i(lqi ))(lqi − lpi ) ≥ V˜i(lri )lpi + T˜i(lri )
since V˜i(li) is non-decreasing and l
q
i > l
p
i . Similarly, we can show that if it is not profitable for
type lri to deviate to type l
q
i and it is not profitable for type l
q
i to deviate to type l
p
i then it
is not profitable for type lri to deviate to type l
p
i . Finally, the same logic applies to the DIC
constraints in (4). (Importantly, this derivation does not apply to multi-dimensional types as
we show in Section 5.) Q.E.D.
11Where λ−1i (zi) = inf{xi ∈ Xi|λi(xi) ≥ zi}.
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